



DORA at de
Volksbank

Learnings from
moving from
3rd to 1st line

GLC Audit Masters

Tijs Wolffenbuttel

Lisbon – 23 May 2024



Tijs Wolffenbittel

de volksbank

asn  bank  BLGwonen  RegioBank  SNS

**4th fourth largest bank
in The Netherlands**

**Numbers 1, 2 and 3 of most
customer friendly
banks in the Netherlands**

IT Director

**Previously:
Chief Audit Executive 2013 to 2022**

ABP

**Largest pension fund
in The Netherlands
(for government, military, education)**

**One of top 10 largest pension funds
worldwide**

**Key Function holder Internal Audit
(parttime)**

Agenda

What is the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA)?

Learnings from the DORA Implementation at de Volksbank

Lessons learned from moving from 3rd to 1st line



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asn bank BLGwonen RegioBank SNS



Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) is applicable to?

Applicable to*

**Only limited exceptions*

How many entities?

About 22.000 Entities in the EU

- Banks
- Payment institutions & electronic money institutions
- Investment firms
- Crypto-asset service providers/issuers
- Central Counterparties (CCPs) and Central Securities Depositories (CSDs)
- Trading venues & trade repositories
- Fund managers
- Data reporting service providers
- (Re)insurance undertakings & intermediaries
- Pension funds
- Credit rating agencies (CRA's)
- Administrators of critical benchmarks
- Crowdfunding service providers & securitisation repositories
- *ICT third-party service providers*

What is the goal of DORA?

The Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) is part of the EU's efforts to regulate the digital sector and enhance operational resilience, boost security requirements to reduce threats and risks from the use of ICT and improve institutions' ability to prevent and deal with ICT related incidents.

Legal basis

A regulation (and an amendment directive)

Status

Entered into force on 16 January 2023,
applicable as of 17 January 2025

Which authorities are responsible for DORA supervision?


- **European Banking Authority (EBA) – supervision performed by European Central Bank (ECB)**
- **European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)**
- **European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA)**

- **And supervision performed by National Competent Authorities (NCAs)**


EU's Digital Decade Strategy



Digital Decade Strategy



EU-rules on data and tech in constant development




*Partially as from 16 Nov 2022

Objectives



Requirements



Requirements: *governance*

- The management body of the financial entity shall define, approve, oversee and be accountable for the implementation of all arrangements related to the ICT risk management framework
- Members of the management body to keep knowledge on ICT risks and the impact thereof up-to-date, including through regular training
- Specific role to be established or member of senior management to be designated to monitor the (risk exposure and documentation of) arrangements for ICT services, especially those with ICT third-party service providers

Requirements: *ICT risk management*

- A sound, comprehensive and well-documented ICT risk management framework to ensure a high level of digital operational resilience
- Covering identification, protection and prevention, detection, response and recovery, learning and evolving and communication
- Up-to-date ICT systems, with enough capacity and resilience in case of stress scenarios
- Three lines of defence-model for ICT risk management
- Annual and periodic review, review after major ICT-related incident and when instructed by the supervisory authority

Requirements: *ICT-related incidents*

- Internal processes to detect, manage and notify ICT-related incidents
- All ICT-related incidents (*and* significant cyber threats) to be recorded
- Timely reporting of 'major' ICT-related incidents to the relevant competent authority
- Informing clients about a major ICT-related incident and significant cyber threat
- Voluntary reporting of significant cyber threats
- (Major) operational incidents and security incidents (previously PSD 2) subject to DORA's incident framework

Requirements: *testing*

- Financial entities to establish, maintain and review a sound and comprehensive digital operational resilience testing programme
- Tests to be undertaken by independent parties, whether internal or external
- Critical systems are tested at least yearly
- Also 'advanced' testing: threat led penetration testing at least every three years for certain identified financial entities

Requirements: *ICT third-party service providers*

- Financial entities to adopt strategy on ICT third party risk (individual and consolidated basis)
- Financial entities to maintain a register of information in relation to all contractual arrangements on the use of ICT services provided by ICT third-party service providers, distinguishing between those that cover critical or important functions and those that do not (individual and consolidated basis)
- Register is shared yearly with the competent authorities or upon their request
- Due diligence on envisaged ICT services and their providers required
- Competent authority to be informed in case of ICT services concerning critical or important functions
- Additional requirements regarding ICT third-party service providers outside the EU
- Existing and new contractual arrangements on ICT services to include specific provisions (e.g. on termination, exit or audit) – not only for outsourcing
- New oversight framework for ICT third-party service providers designated by European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) as ‘critical’ for financial entities
- Financial entities may *not* use critical ICT third-party service providers based outside the EU that have not established an EU subsidiary within 12 months of designation
- Critical ICT-third party service provider does not have to perform services out of EU subsidiary

Final notes: *information sharing (chapter vi)*

- Financial entities may exchange amongst themselves *cyber threat* information and intelligence, including indicators of compromise, tactics, techniques, and procedures, cyber security alerts and configuration tools, to the extent that such information and intelligence sharing:
 - takes places within ‘trusted communities’
 - is implemented through information-sharing arrangements that protect the potentially sensitive nature of the information shared (business confidentiality, protection of personal data and guidelines on competition policy)

Some other key points

Overlap between DORA and Guidelines, but differences in scope and substance

DORA goes beyond outsourcing: all ICT-related contracts in scope.


No grandfathering of existing ICT-related contracts; contracts to be repapered by 17 January 2025

Level II (RTS): Further details of requirements

**Deadline
for the
ESAs final
standards**

**RTS
Regulatory
Technical
Standards**

	By 17 January 2024	By 17 July 2024	By 17 January 2025
	RTS on procedures regarding ICT incident and cyber threat classification	RTS regarding reporting of ICT incidents	ESA report on the establishment of a central EU-hub for incident reporting
	RTS on level of detail required in firms' ICT third-party provider strategies	RTS on scope and additional elements for advanced testing requirements	
	RTS specifying further elements of the ICT risk management framework	RTS on key contractual provisions for subcontracting function	
	RTS on the Register of Information on ICT third-party contractual arrangements	RTS on information to be provided by a CTPP to the Lead Overseer	
	RTS specifying further elements of the ICT risk management framework	Delegated Act from the Commission on CTPP designation and on the oversight fees for CTPPS	
		RTS on the designation of members of a Joint Examination Team	



Impact of DORA

Reduce the possibility/duration of ransomware, data leakage, downtime, bad software quality at bank level → keeping the *trust level* in the bank high

More focus on:

- **Software quality** through more/better performance testing, load testing
- **Critical business functions**, instead on solely applications (complete fallback test for business functions)
- **Stakeholder management** in the incident process and (pro)active informing our customers
- **Disaster-Recovery** scenarios
- (digital) **3rd party** suppliers and the possible risks
- **Information security** (i.e. detect and response mechanisms)

What should DORA bring in our *actions* and *mindset*



Learnings from the DORA Implementation at de Volksbank

de volksbank

asn  bank  BLGwonen  RegioBank  SNS

Lessons learned on DORA implementation, but this approach can be useful for implementation of other legislation as well

1. **Start early** (sorry, too late for this lesson learned now) de Volksbank in general not so good in timely and fully implementing new regulations. Several observations in my previous role as Chief Auditor. When switching from 3rd to 1st line I wanted to do this differently.
2. **Knowledge sharing** with peers
3. **DORAThon**, perform a gap analysis with all parties involved in hackathon style: good for insights, focus and collaboration
4. Define your **critical and important functions** (this can create quite some discussion)
5. Choose an approach with **linking DORA to all relevant internal policies** and roll out work packages to all relevant departments. Our **decentral organisation** does not make quick progress, standardisation and demonstrability very easy and created some budget and staffing issues for DORA
6. Spend a lot of time to **educate and train the organisation**, especially business owners of applications
7. **Implementation of ALM/LCM (for overview), Major Incident Management and BCM application modules**
8. **Adjusting contracts with suppliers** takes a lot of time and effort: especially when there is already a backlog at Procurement: remediation on Procurement process and contracts was still ongoing
9. Make your DORA implementation really **sustainable and demonstrable. Demonstrability** often is an issue and difficult to realise
10. So therefore: **create once, use many** (for multiple assurance assignments)

Finally: **Make DORA a blessing in disguise! And more to come**, because we are still implementing

Impact for de Volksbank | efforts needed to comply with DORA

		Requirements to do (85)	Requirements with low impact < 6 months realisation time (51)	Requirements with big impact > 6 months realisation time (34)
DORA pilars	 Governance	4	1	3
	 ICT risk management	36	22	14
	 ICT incident reporting	9	7	2
	 Testing digital operational resilience	16	8	8
	 ICT third-party service providers	20	13	7
		85	51	34

Epic owners in relation to the DORA pillars | the expertise centres are responsible for designing and the implementation of the DORA requirements

DORA pillars

DORA scope

Departments responsible for design, policy setting & trigger for implementation



Governance

EC Risk – Kern BRT Tech, Klant & Bankieren
EC HR



ICT risk management

EC Tech – Kern Security & Continuity
EC Tech – Kern IT Processen
EC Tech – Kern Architectuur
EC Risk – Kern BRT Tech, Klant & Bankieren



ICT incident reporting

EC Tech – Kern IT Processen
EC Tech – Kern Security & Continuity
EC Risk – Kern BRT Tech, Klant & Bankieren
EC Risk – Supervisory Office



Testing digital operational resilience

EC Tech – Kern Security & Continuity
EC Tech – Kern IT Processen



ICT third-party service providers

EC Tech – Kern Security & Continuity
EC Tech – Kern IT Processen
EC Risk – Kern BRT Tech, Klant & Bankieren
EC Risk – Supervisory Office


Examples of DORA requirements and activities | overview of requirements that de Volksbank has to comply with (from analysis performed in Q1 2023)

DORA scope DORA makes the Volksbank organization as a whole more operationally resilient → therefore not exclusively an ICT matter
 DORA applies to: 1) all internal business functions of de Volksbank and 2) all external ICT service providers that support these business functions

DORA pillars



	Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> The Boards and senior management are involved, supervise and responsible for the realization and implementation of DORA <input type="checkbox"/> The Boards and senior management keep knowledge about ICT risks and their impact up-to-date, including through regular training <input type="checkbox"/> De Volksbank has an internal governance and control framework that ensures effective and prudent management of ICT risk
	ICT risk management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> There is a thorough, comprehensive and well-documented ICT risk management framework → EC Tech "From Policy to Impact!" <input type="checkbox"/> ICT systems are up-to-date, with sufficient capacity and resilience in case of stress scenarios <input type="checkbox"/> Annual and periodic review after major ICT-related incident, also at request of the competent authority
	ICT incident reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Customers are informed in a timely manner about major ICT-related incidents and significant cyber threats <input type="checkbox"/> Major ICT-related incidents and cyber-threats are reported to the relevant competent authority <input type="checkbox"/> (major) operational and security incidents (formerly PSD 2) are covered by DORA
	Testing digital operational resilience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> There is a comprehensive digital operational resilience testing program, critical systems are tested at least annually <input type="checkbox"/> Cyber threat tests are carried out internally or externally by independent parties <input type="checkbox"/> Test findings are reported and resolved
	ICT third-party service providers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> All contract agreements with ICT third-party service providers contain specific DORA provisions (e.g. about termination, exit or right to audit) <input type="checkbox"/> Critical ICT third-party service providers are designated by European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) <input type="checkbox"/> De Volksbank can't have contracts with critical ICT third-party service providers from outside the EU that do not have an EU subsidiary

Roadmap | critical dates and milestones towards DORA compliancy



By the way. DORA will not stop...

Way of working for phase 1 | Agile tooling JIRA is used for DORA work distribution and progress tracking. EPICS are defined as Chapter-Article and User Stories on paragraph level



Weekly progression monitoring


1. **Qualitative** in weekly progression dialogs (status, progress, impediments)
2. **Quantitative** in Jira via progress on finished user stories (i.e. by filtering on Dora define label)

Onderliggende issues


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ID	Issue	Status
KSEC-1321	DORA-2-8-1 [XL] = TOD (opzet, bestaan) : "ICT Risicobeheer"	ACTIEF
KSEC-1289	DORA-2-11-1 [M] = TOD (opzet, bestaan) : "ICT Risicobeheer"	ACTIEF
KSEC-1233	DORA-2-14-1 [S] TOD (opzet, bestaan) : "ICT Risicobeheer"	ACTIEF
KSEC-1231	DORA-4-26-1 [S] = TOD (opzet, bestaan) : "Testen Digitale Operationele weerbaarheid"	PENDING
KSEC-1322	DORA-4-26-2 [L] TOD (opzet, bestaan) : "Testen van digitale operationele weerbaarheid"	ACTIEF
KSEC-1265	https://devolksbank.atlassian.net/browse/KSEC-1284	CANCELLED
KSEC-1266	https://devolksbank.atlassian.net/browse/KSEC-1284	CANCELLED


Phase 2 | Implementation | ECs make logical work items to be implemented by Hubs or ECs




Approach and priorities | the DORA roadmap consists of two phases 1) policy definition and 2) policy implementation. Priorities are set for phase 1



IT Systems Risk | from legislation/regulation, best practices and market standards – to policy, frameworks and execution



From policy to impact | clear and consistent structure, facilitating effective execution combined with reporting and risk acceptance



Lessons learned from moving from 3rd to 1st line



Lessons learned from my move from 3rd to 1st line

Chief Audit Executive
33 operational and IT
auditors



IT Director
750 - 1000 IT engineers,
architects, process & security
specialists, managers, etc.

Lessons learned from my move from 3rd to 1st line

1. **High over reporting** on issues is useful for the executive and supervisory boards but often not sufficient for creating full impact in the business: I was already aware of many issues but they were much more severe and structural than as seen from an audit point of view
2. **How really visible in the organization are you and your team?** Looking at Audit from this role, Audit is even less visible than I thought!
3. **Too much auditing by emailing and videoconferencing:** do you than actually see what is happening? Data analytics including process mining is one of the things to get better insights into what is actually happening.
4. Although already fully aware of the need to do this: still spend more time on **root cause analysis** (7 times why) Really understand how busy first line management is and why things are not seen, not prioritized, not done.
5. Often: **do not make use of second line insights and work too much:** too often they were way to far from seeing and understanding what is really happening in the business, especially when looking at non-financial risks.
6. **Knowing the capabilities of audit staff** helps to better ask for support from them and / or pointing out useful audits and audit scopes. Help the business better understand what the audit department is capable of (don't expect this to be known info)
7. Finally, what I already said when I was heading the audit department and is to my opinion still applicable: the more you dare to cooperate with 1st and 2nd line the more added value you can deliver, **do not be too afraid of losing independence:** almost all auditors tend to have a very good GPS to remain independent, and just provide the right training to keep those GPS calibrated.
8. **It's really hard work in the first line, give them some slack and understanding sometimes!**